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A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime
for a "Post-Modern" United States
Army Corps of Engineers
A. Dan Tarlock*
I.

THE CORPS, HYPER-RATIONALITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW

A.

The Corps: The Very Model of a Modem Administrative Agency
Under Stress

The United States Army Corps of Engineers' (the Corps) ability to apply
rational methods of analysis to plan and build projects became a model for
the hyper-rational administrative agency decisions that we have come to expect in environmental and safety standard setting. 1 From its initial organization during the Revolutionary War to the present, the Corps has combined
military discipline with the practice of rigorous state-of-the-art engineering,
hydrology, and economics to turn many of the nation's unruly rivers into
tamed, working systems. 2 Today, the Corps' projects support commercial
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LLB. 1965 Stanford
University. National Fellow, National Academies. [his article grows out of my service between 20022004 on the National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences Coordinating Committee of the
Committee to Assess the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Methods of Analysis and Peer Review for Water
Resources Planning. The final Coordinating Committee report, WATER RESOURCES PLANNING BY THE
CORPS OF ENGINEERS: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR SERVICE, (2004), is published along with the reports of
four other committees that deal with specific aspects of Corps policy and practice. The views (and errors
of law, descriptions of Corps practice, or judgment) expressed in this article are solely those of the author
and do not reflect the views of the NRC/NAS, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, or any members of the
five committees. This article benefited greatly from opportunities to present it at faculty workshops at the
Florida State University School of Law in October 2003, and the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University in April 2004, as well as at the 2004 Kansas University Law Review Symposium,
Reforming Environmental Law: Can Regulation Be More Adaptive?, organized by Professors Sidney
Shapiro and Robert Glicksman at the University of Kansas School of Law, March 4, 2004. A special note
of thanks goes to Jon Zerger and the Kansas Law Review staff for their warm and efficient hospitality in
Lawrence, on a Jayhawk basketball night no less.
1. In their important study of pollution and toxic level standard setting, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING APRAGMATIC APPROACH 10-24 (2003), Professors Shapiro and Glicksman trace and criticize
the shift from pragmatic, bounded rationality to the search for perfect or hyper-rational environmental
regulation in the form of front-end, cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is vigorously defended in
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT KELLY SCHNEIDERS, UNRULY RIVER: Two CENTURIES OF CHANGE ALONG

THE MISSOURI 1 (1999).
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navigation,3 mitigate downstream flood damages,4 generate hydroelectric
power, store and deliver water supplies for rural and urban areas, and provide opportunities for water-based recreation. 5 The Corps also maintains
deep water ports and attempts to stabilize coastal and inland beaches. Beyond these tangible achievements, the Corps was the first agency to use formal benefit-cost analysis in its decisions 6 and pioneered the use of the "best
available science" and economics to define the public or national interest in
resource management-a goal that remains at the heart of modem debates
about the appropriate level of environmental regulation. 7
This impressive legacy of water management has produced both substantial national benefits 8 and considerable, off-balance-sheet, long-ignored
costs, such as the loss of riverine ecosystem services and the inefficient expenditure of public monies. With the end of the "golden age" of Big Dam
construction in the United States, 9 the Corps now finds itself an agency under stress.' 0 National values related to water have fundamentally shifted, and
this shift also has precipitated a decline in the primacy of science and engineering to provide acceptable resource management options. We are now
3. The Corps' navigation support role is critically evaluated in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
INLAND NAVIGATION SYSTEM PLANNING: THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER-ILLINOIS WATERWAY (2001).
4. Despite its formidable title, REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE TO THE ADMINISTRATION FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, SHARING THE
CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE 21 ST CENTURY (1994), which was charged with assessing ways to prevent the 1993 Upper Mississippi floods, is an excellent analysis of the Corps' flood control
policy and alternative options. Two important critical histories of the Corps' flood control policies are
ARTHUR E. MORGAN, DAMS AND OTHER DISASTERS: A CENTURY OF ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN
CIVIL WORKS (1971), and JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND
How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1997).
5. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNrrED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 187-99 (1973), contains a good discussion of the use of Corps reservoirs for water-based recreation.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
7. See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplayof Statistics,Judgment,
and Procedurein EnvironmentalLaw, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497 (2004), for a balanced analysis of
the debate and constructive suggestions about the role of science in environmental regulation. Richard W.
Parker, Grading the Government,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003), is an important empirical study of the
severe limitations of current efforts to assess the costs and benefits of pollution regulation.
8. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra introductory footnote.
9. See JOHN R. FERRELL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM (U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs.
1993), for a history of the largest dam building program entrusted to the Corps. The growing move away
from large water resources projects is a world-wide trend, e.g. WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS
AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT (2000), although dam building is alive and
well in places such as China.
10. For a summary of the current criticisms of the Corps, see WATER RESOURCES PLANNING BY THE
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 8, at introductory footnote. Throughout its history, the agency has
always faced opponents of its mission and methods, but the Corps was able to rely, as they can no longer,
on a widespread consensus about the need to modify waterways and coastal systems. See infra Part IlI.
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paying much more attention to mitigating and restoring the hydrologic regimes that the Corps changed than to planning new projects." To complicate matters, this shift is occurring as the federal government is retreating
from its historic role as the exclusive developer and manager of many of the
nation's major rivers 12 and thus, a major guardian of the national interest in
water resources.' 3 Federal power is devolving, fragmenting and withering, 4
both vertically and horizontally.
The Corps is unlikely to wither away in the foreseeable future. In fact,
the "post-modem" vision of the Corps is an agency whose primary mission is
river and coastal ecosystem restoration and the management of its existing
infrastructure. The two missions overlap because infrastructure management
may be increasingly tied to its restoration mission. 15 To do this, the Corps
must become "greener," bolder, and more experimental in its resource management,16 which includes the more efficient and flexible management of its
11. William R. Jordan Il argues that there have been three fundamental views of nature. The older,
and still dominant view, is that nature is a commodity to be exploited for human benefit. The modem
environmental movement adopted the view of nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers, such as
Thoreau and John Muir, believed that nature is sacred. Jordan argues that we must move to the view that
humans and non-humans make up a dynamic community. WILLIAM R. JORDAN IMl,THE SUNFLOWER
FOREST: ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION AND THE NEW COMMUNION WITH NATURE 28-30 (2003). Envi-

ronmental restoration is a non-romantic means to allow humans to interact with others and redeem previous acts of unrestrained consumption. Id. at 72-73.
12. The Corps is the nation's oldest water resources agency. In the twentieth century, its monopoly
was challenged in the West by the Bureau of Reclamation and in the Tennessee Valley by the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). However, the Corps managed to challenge the Bureau on its own turf and block
its expansion outside of the Seventeen Reclamation Act states. The TVA was to be the model for the
development of all the nation's major rivers, but the Corps and states succeeded in making sure that the
TVA experiment was not repeated in other basins. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
13. In the nineteenth century, the national interest in water resources use expanded from the promotion of interstate commerce on navigable rivers to national economic development. In the twentieth century, the national interest was first expanded to include reservoir construction for flood control and water
supply, then to development of extensive port and coastal erosion projects and the promotion of interstate
equity, and finally to environmental heritage conservation. The Corps' primary mission remains the promotion of interstate commerce, which includes the maintenance of our navigable highways and national
economic development. National economic development is primarily associated with flood control. The
Corps has also contributed to the national goal of interstate equity by building projects that riparian states
use to share the benefits of interstate rivers. Finally, the national government has long asserted an interest
in conserving resources that it deemed important to the nation as a whole. The Corps' heritage functions
include the regulation of water quality, biodiversity protection, and the restoration of modified ecosystems.
14. As of 2004, the Corps has no new large reservoirs underway, and the Bureau of Reclamation has
only one. GAO, FRESHWATER SUPPLY: STATES' VIEWS OF HOW FEDERAL AGENCIES CoULD HELP THEM
MEET THE CHALLENGES OF EXPECTED SHORTAGES 48 (2003) [hereinafter FRESHWATER SUPPLY], avail-

able at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-binlgetrpt?GAO-02-514 (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
15. The relationship between aquatic ecosystem restoration and the reoperation of existing projects is
explored in MICHAEL COLLIER ETI
AL., DAMS AND RIVERS: A PRIMER ON THE DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF

DAMS (U.S. Geological Survey, Circular 1126, 1996).
16. See Jeffrey W. Jacobs, Broadening U.S. Water Resources ProjectPlanningand Evaluation,42
NAT. RESOURCES J. 21 (2002), for a summary of recent criticisms of rational, but static, water resources
planning. The National Research Council, recommended, inter alia,
"movement away from consideration
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existing infrastructure for dedicated purposes such as flood control, navigation enhancement, and water supply. 17 True to its historic capacity to adapt
to changed political conditions,
the Corps is eager to follow the money and
18
functions.
its
expand
This is easier said than done because the Corps is being pulled in two
potentially inconsistent directions. One reform strand asks the agency to let
go of its claimed monopoly on scientific and engineering water expertiseand more generally, on the national interest-and to engage in open-ended
collaborative processes, which solve problems by consensus rather than
managing by unilateral agency processes. The revival of watershed planning
in the 1990s is an example of this reform. At the same time, the agency is
also being asked to adopt new and better rational techniques, such as adaptive management and ecosystem services valuation, to plan and manage even
more rationally at the largest geographic scale possible to implement holistic
water resource polices that integrate a wider range of values than it did in the
past. The conservation era dream of integrated river basin development led
to the idea of the fully harnessed river where no drop of water reached the
sea. Few want to return to this model, but many reform proposals try to
adapt the conservation movement's dream of comprehensive, large-scale or
holistic watershed and river basin planning and management to the full range
of modern water uses, including the "normative" or more natural river, 19 that
society now deems valuable.
B. ProposedReforms: Power Sharing and Rational Experimentation
These new Corps missions and the evolving political context in which
they will occur pose profound challenges both for the legal regime under
which the Corps has operated and, more generally, for the maintenance of
rule of law values in future resources management. 20 As applied to adminisof the National Economic Development (NED) account as the most important concern," the use of the
watershed or estuarial region as the basic planning unit, and the adoption of adaptive management approaches. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEw DIRECTIONS IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING FOR THE
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 1-9 (1999) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].

17. This will be a challenge because the storage capacity of many dams is diminishing. FRESHWATER SUPPLY, supra note 14, at 25-26. Also, urban demands continue to increase in many areas of the
country.

18. The agency has adopted Environmental Operating Principles, which it now incorporates in all its
strategy documents. E.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, USACE 2012: ALIGNING THE U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS FOR SUCCESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY iii (2003), available at
http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/stakeholders/Final.htm (last visited May 28, 2004).
19. Jack A. Stanford et al., A General Protocolfor the Restoration of Regulated Rivers, 12 REGULATED RIVERS: RES. & MGMT. 391 (1996).

20. For a summary of the rule of law debates and literature, see Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in
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trative law, the rule of law requires that "extra" constitutional agencies be
accountable, both politically and judicially. Specifically, state power must
be exercised in a non-arbitrary manner, be grounded in known laws, and be
subject to independent judicial review. The calls for "out-of-the-box" thinking and management 21 could require a fundamentally different and potentially less accountable process of decision making at a time when fewer persons trust the Corps to represent the national or public interest in water
resources and when no satisfactory alternative model of water governance
has emerged. In addition, there is less and less faith in hyper-rationality as a
legitimate basis for decision making. Put differently, the "modem," "hyper22
rational" Corps is being asked to undertake "post-modem," "wicked,,
long-term, science-based experiments under conditions of varying uncertainty-which stresses our understanding of "sound" science and rational
policy making-while still improving the rationality of its processes.
Decision-making rationality traditionally has been promoted through incremental reform in an agency's analytical methods; however, this strategy is
unlikely to address adequately the problems that the Corps now faces. Recent National Academy of Sciences studies of the Corps point out three fundamental problems with Corps planning. First, the planning often occurs in
a policy vacuum. The United States government no longer has a coherent
federal water policy as it did when multiple-use development was embraced.
Second, there are many calls for the Corps to plan and manage on larger and
more integrated geographic scales than they have in the past.23 All National
Research Council (the research arm of the National Academy of Sciences)
studies and others have endorsed the idea that the watershed is the correct
scale for project planning and that individual projects should be planned and
managed to achieve basin-wide objectives, but no one really knows what
these recommendations mean operationally.24 Third, the studies have identiChina, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001).

21.

Professor David H. Getches, in The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal

Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsedthe States' Role? 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2001), defines "outside-

the-box" solutions as ad hoc coalitions that have come together to solve a specific basin issue (usually the
protection of a listed endangered or threatened species) outside a traditional regulatory framework. Id. at
42.
22. As Professor Holly Doremus has acutely observed, "[blecause environmental problems are
wicked, they cannot be solved objectively." Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and EnvironmentalPolicy,
22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 332 (2003).
23. See generally,NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER BASINS AND COASTAL SYSTEMS PLANNING
WITHIN THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (2004).
24. See generally DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, NATIONAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, ARGUING ABOUT
CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE GROUPS ACTIVE IN NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (2000), available at

http://www.colorado.edu/Law/centers/nrlc/publications/RR23.pdf

(last visited May 28, 2004).
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fled marginal technical improvements in the evaluation techniques used from
non-user value assessment to flood risk confidence levels. 25 These evaluations, however, have indirectly raised, but have not confronted, the larger
question: what, if anything, does rational project planning and management
mean in a world when fewer large-scale projects are likely to be undertaken
and value conflicts are increasing?
C. Hyper-rationalityand the Rule of Law
The Corps has not attracted much attention from administrative law
scholars, but it is a classic example of the increasing futility of our insistence
on hyper-rationality to control administrative discretion. The architects of
the modem administrative state sought regulatory mechanisms that would
allow the application of state power to changing economic, social, and scientific conditions. Originally, it was assumed that enlightened expertise would
be an adequate substitute for the rule of law administered by common law
judges. Accordingly, courts were taught that separation of powers principles
required deference to administrative discretion. 26 This mantra is often repeated and applied, but the underlying rationale for deference has greatly
eroded in the past fifty years. In addition, the Anglo-American identification
of the law with common law judges 27 has always ensured that deference
would be wildly uneven and distrusted.
The roots of the erosion of faith in expertise lie in the legal reaction to
the New Deal, which led to the resurgence of judicial control of the administrative state. 28 After a decade-long debate about the proper role of judicial
control of administrative action, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
(APA) rejected unconstrained discretion, no matter how expert. The APA
relied primarily on the application of due process during the decision. Erosion was accelerated in the 1960s by two trends. The various social revolu25.

See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN

RIVER SYSTEM: AN EVALUATION (1995).
26. The Supreme Court has not directly applied the non-delegation doctrine to invalidate an act of
Congress since A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Judge Stephen
Williams applied the doctrine to invalidate the standard setting provisions of the Clean Air Act in Am.
Trucking Ass'ns v. United States Envtl. ProtectionAgency, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. 1999), but the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require Congress to specify the precise limits of the
harm that can be regulated in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472-73 (2001). However,
unlike other legal scholars, I find the delegation of state power to private individuals troubling. See infra
text accompanying notes 155-58.
27. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Professionand the Development ofAdministrativeLaw, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1139-45 (1997).
28. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative ProcedureAct
Emergesfrom New Deal Politics,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
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tions of the 1960s and early 1970s coincided with the rise of the deeply pessimistic doctrines of law and economics and public choice theory.29 These
two developments helped undermine the New Deal faith in administrative
expertise to articulate the public interest. As a result, agencies are now simultaneously constrained both by the "public," which has been given a voice
30
to counter the narrow exercise of administrative expertise, and the courts.
Public participation in agency decision making and increased access to
judicial review are the hallmarks of modem administrative law. The new
governance mantra is collaboration and consensus instead of implementation
of Congressional mandates. Although the merits of this approach are open
to serious debate, it is a logical extension of the disintegration of the New
Deal state that began in the 1960s. The regulated community is still the central participant in administrative decision making, but new interests or
"stakeholders" beyond those with a direct economic benefit in the agency's
actions are increasingly included in the multiparty bargaining processes.
Federal agencies, such as the Corps, are increasingly often only one of many
powerful participants in resource management disputes. Collaborate governance has many potential positive possibilities, but it also has the potential
to undermine rule of law values if collaboration leads to an erosion of rules
and standards intended to reflect the national interest.31
More generally, the vision of the Corps as an experimental, collaborative
agency poses three paradoxes for the promotion of rule of law values. First,
the Corps is often portrayed by environmentalists as a lawless agency, but in
fact, it is a model "rule of law" agency compared to sister management agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation. The Corps pays careful attention to
its Congressional mandates and seldom engages in creative legislative reinterpretation, unlike the Department of Interior, especially under the Reagan
and Bush II administrations. 32 Calls to adopt more holistic, integrated water29. The foundational works are ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957),
and JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

OF CONSITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
30. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law. 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669 (1975).
31. The question of the relationship between the collaborative "contract" state to traditional understandings of the rule of law is the subject of much scholarly debate. Professors Jody Freeman and Bradley
C. Karkkainen, among others, have been tracking the break-up of the modem regulatory state and the role
of public law in the emerging "lite" state. E.g., Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 155 (2000); Bradley C. Karkkainem, CollaborativeEcosystem Governance:Scale, Complexity, and
Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adapative Ecosystem Management
and Regulatory Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2003). See generally
MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBURG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: How AMERICA SIDELINED
ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC (2002).
32. See generally WILLIAM SNAPE Il1 & JOHN M. CARTER 1I, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, WEAKEN-
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shed approaches to its activities and to be more proactive in "instructing"
Congress on improved water resources options push the agency away from
the conventional understanding of the rule of law.33 Thus, decisions may be
both more ephemeral and less transparent and, as a result, harder to subject
to either political or judicial accountability.
Second, critics of the resource agencies continue to place great faith in
improved rational planning, be it through NEPA or benefit-cost analysis
processes, as a means to improve agency performance and simultaneously
control it.3 4 The Corps presently adheres rigorously to rational planning, but
it has reached the outer limits of its utility. In addition, rational planning has
often been reduced to a formal exercise unconnected to the achievement of
the underlying social objective. The very concept of rational planning as an
appropriate decision tool is open to serious doubt. 35 Rational methods, including the idea that science can provide neutral decision criteria, have been
criticized for masking inevitable, difficult value choices.36 The erosion of
faith science and rationality has the potential to decrease, rather than increase, the accountability of the agency because it increases incentives to
"broker" solutions, thereby leading to the third paradox.
The third paradox arises because reliance on scientific and technical expertise is increasingly being supplemented with more participatory, openended processes that permit the substitution of the "political" or the "ethical"
as science-based decisions. Many hail this as a welcome adaptation of democratic and public values to the "de-centered" state, but the question of
whether the "contracting" state will be consistent with public or rule of law
values is open to say the least.37

ING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: How THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION USES THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
TO
WEAKEN
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
(2003),
available at

http://www.defenders.org/publications/nepareport.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
34. E.g., NEW DIRECTIONS, supranote 17.
35. The twentieth century has not been kind to the Enlightenment values of reason and objectivity.
For a lucid account of the post World War n1project of reasserting enlightenment values after World War
II and the Holocaust, see IRA KATZNELSON, DESOLATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT: PoLIIcAL KNOWLEDGE
AFrER TOTAL WAR, TOTALITARIANISM, AND THE HOLOCAUST (2003).
36. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PA. ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 135 (2002)
(discussing the proper role of science in watershed environmental disputes).
37. Collaborative governance used to be called agency capture. Under the influence of law and
economics, the "captured" theory of agencies has now been discredited. However, students of earlier,
failed collaborative western resource management experiments, such as the Taylor Grazing Act, are not
excited about this new wave of stakeholder governance. E.g., George Cameron Coggins, Regulating
FederalNatural Resources: A Summary Case Against Devolved Collaboration,26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 603

(1999).
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D. The Argument: Adieu to RationalityAlone
This Article uses the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)
as a case study to explore the tension between subjecting agencies to the rule
of law through both hyper-rational procedures and close Congressional control on the one hand while allowing them to adapt to social change by being
more experimental and collaborative on the other. The Corps is an interesting case study for three reasons. First, it is both a conventional regulatory
agency and a mission development agency. It issues permits to dredge and
fill wetlands under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 38 and other activities
that interfere with navigation, 39 and it builds water resources projects wherever it can. Second, it has a long tradition of rational decision making.
Third, both of its functions continue to be criticized on fiscal and environmental grounds at the same time that the beneficiaries of the Corps' largesse
fervently defend the status quo. Thus, the Corps is a good case study to examine whether there is a middle ground between a legal regime based on the
traditional rule of law model and one that acknowledges the need for minimally constrained "expertise."
The Corps is an especially good, but tough, case because the agency is
both within and outside the rule of law project. It is outside the traditional
rule of law project because the ultimate issue in resource management is not
whether decisions are rational or fair, but rather whether they make sense
from a scientific and value perspective. Bad resource management decisions
are very difficult to reverse, if they can be reversed at all. It is inside the project because of its long tradition of strict fidelity to the letter of Congressional mandates.
This Article traces the roots of the erosion of our faith in the Corps' rational processes. It then briefly summarizes the history of the Corps' rise as
a rational management agency to illustrate how deeply faith in rationality is
embedded in the agency, and it concludes with an analysis of some of the
legal consequences of the reforms proposed to adjust the Corps to its new
restoration, reoperation, and adaptive management missions. It argues that
efforts to reorient the Corps will raise challenging questions of administrative law for two fundamental reasons. First, the Corps' non-regulatory missions make it less amenable than many other agencies to judicial control,
especially when compared to agencies with standard setting and adjudicative
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001). Section 404 evaluates the impacts of change on a case-by-case basis
over relatively small geographic scales as a previous NRC publication noted critically. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2001).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 406 (2001).
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missions. Second, the Corps, like most administrative agencies, is not structured to be reflective over the long run. It tries to construct the optimum project and to get everything "right" the first time, rather than trying to adjust
constantly to changed conditions and new knowledge.
This Article's primary argument is that we cannot rely on continual incremental adjustments in agency rationality to increase accountability. We
have reached the limits of improving the agency's rationality. Increasingly,
the proposals depart from the search for hyper-rationality and call for increased Corps delegation of discretion, less reliance on front-end rational
processes, and more attention to continuous evaluation and modification of
project objectives. This Article concludes that the best that we can hope for

is that the law governing the Corps should function as science does. 40 The
law must provide a carefully structured and monitored process of iteration,
provisional acceptance, and constant experimentation, validation, and revision in light of new knowledge and insight. Courts have a role to play in this
process, but it will be a limited one. We must rely on other internal and external checks of agency performance.
II. THE DILEMMA OF THE POST-MODERN CORPS: ENLIGHTENMENT
VALUES IN A PARTICIPATORY, SPIRITUAL ERA
A. Enlightenment Values and the Corps
The Corps is a product and embodiment of the Enlightenment's faith in

scientific progress, and the roots of its problems are a manifestation of the
tension between enlightenment and post-enlightenment values created by the
horrors of the twentieth century. The Enlightenment produced the idea of
scientific and human progress that thrived until the beginning of the twentieth century. The method for achieving this progress was scientific rationality. The two great wars of the twentieth century put an end to the idea (or
illusion) of human progress, 4 1but the idea of rational scientific progress had
a good run and continues to be the dominant decision making paradigm.
The nineteenth century bequeathed the twin ideas of progress and expertise
to the twentieth century, forming the basis for the legitimacy of the expert
administrative agency. These twin ideas influenced water management as a
result of the progressive or scientific conservation movement. Progressives
rejected Darwinistic determinism and insisted "that evolution had produced

40.
41.

I am indebted to Professor Holly Doremus of the University of California at Davis for this point.
See generally KATZNELSON, supra note 35.
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human intelligence. '42 The Corps personified this optimism, especially after
World War II when advances in mathematics, particularly game theory, held
out the hope that optimum, rational solutions to problems, such as water resource use, could be objectively calculated and measured.43 Rational public
investment would better the human condition by harnessing nature.
The Corps' enlightenment legacy is stressed by two intertwined criticisms of its performance. Initially, the need for public works in the New
Deal and the immediate aftermath of World War II shielded the Corps from
the loss of faith in rationality and progress. In the 1970s, however, two
powerful forces came together to undermine the twin pillars of the Corps'
historic mission of improving nature through objective, rational processes.
The new environmental movement adopted many of the earlier fiscal criticisms of subsidized federal investment in water resources" as inefficient to
challenge the need for new, large projects, while concurrently arguing that
the Corps' mission was morally wrong because it destroyed nature.45
B. The Benefit-Cost Issue
One of the great unanswered questions of public policy is whether governments can in fact spend money efficiently, assuming that this is a desirable goal. 46 Fiscal discipline has been one of the great projects of welfare
economics, and federal water resources spending has been a great laboratory.
42. EDwARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OFDEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 10 (1973).

43. In 1955, the Rockefeller Foundation established the Harvard Water Program, which brought
together leading engineers and economists to train graduate students and mid-career professionals in state
of the art water project design. Maynard M. Hufschmidt, The HarvardProgram:A Summing Up, in
WATER RESEARCH 441 (Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds., 1966). For a history of the foundation
of rational planning, probabilistic hydrology models, see generally Martin A. Reuss, ProbabilityAnalysis
and the Searchfor Hydrologic Orderin the United States, 1885-1945, 4 WATER RESOURCES IMPACT

No. 3 (Am. Water Res. Ass'n, Middleburg, VA.), May 2002,
http://www.awra.org/impact/0205impact.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004).

at

7,

available at

44. The Corps was required to perform benefit-cost studies on its projects in the Flood Control Act

of 1936. See infra Part m.C. From the beginning, there was sustained academic criticism that the agency
inflated the benefits of its proposal. See, e.g., S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Benefit-CostAnalysis and Public
Resource Development, in ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 9,16-

19 (Stephen C. Smith, Emery N. Castle eds., 1964) (discussing the practice of including secondary or
indirect project benefits even though they are likely to occur regardless of the public investment). For an
early account of the matter, see generally ARTHUR MAASS, MUDDY WATERS: THE ARMY ENGINEERS AND
THE NATION'S RIVERS (1951).

45. For an early, now forgotten, polemic against the "sins" of the Corps and engineers in general, see
generally GENE MARINE, AMERICA THE RAPED: THE ENGINEERING MENTALITY AND THE DEVASTATION
OF A CONTINENT (1969).
46. For a classic discussion of the question in the context of water resources, see generally ROLAND
N. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: WITH EMPHASIS ON WATER
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT (1958).
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In 1936, the Corps was instructed by Congress to calculate the costs and
benefits of its projects,47 but there was little understanding of what this
meant. Gradually, economists created the applied art of benefit-cost analysis
to do this.48 By the 1950s, the Corps began to face two separate challenges
that came together and led to a shift away from large-scale dams, levees, and
channel improvement projects and toward a greater emphasis on environmental protection. 49 The first came from economists and students of river
basin development. These critics raised both questions about the technical
methods that the Corps used to compute costs and benefits and more generally questioned the economic desirability promoting regional development
through dam construction. Others, such as the distinguished Gilbert White,
questioned the almost sole reliance on structural flood control measures and
advocated for a broader mix of structural and non-structural alternatives to
address the so-called moral hazard problem, wherein increased flood plain
protection increases its attractiveness for development, creating the cycle of
increasing losses.
Formal benefit-cost analysis was an important innovation, despite the
repeated questioning of the efficiency of large scale public works since
Thomas Jefferson's presidency. The Corps has tried to execute its costbenefit mandate, but its assumptions and calculations have long been questioned and often found wanting. This reflects a long tension between the
Corps' vision of an elite, expert agency that should be allowed to define the
national interest and the more democratic idea that public spending should
be disciplined by subjecting public spending to a standard similar to private
spending. The former idea was beautifully expressed by a Corps officer in
1826. "'When a nation undertakes a work of great public utility the revenue
is not the central object to take into consideration: its views are of a more
elevated order-and they are all, it may be said, exclusively, directed toward
the great and general interests of the community ... -50
The Corps responded to the requirement that it do benefit-cost analysis
by developing a highly structured, rational planning process.5 1 Benefit-cost
47. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2001).
48. The literature is enormous. For an example discussion of this analysis in relation to water resource system planning in general, see generally CHARLES W. HOWE, Am. Geophysical Union, Water
Res. Monograph No. 2, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR WATER SYSTEM PLANNING (1971).
49. See generally BEATRICE HORT HOLMES, Dep't. of Agric., Misc. Pub. No. 1379, HISTORY OF
FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, 1961-1970 (1979).
50. TODD SHALLAT, STRUCTURES IN THE STREAM: WATER, SCIENCE, AND THE RISE OF THE U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 132 (1994) (quoting SIMON BERNARD Er AL., REPORT FROM THE BOARD OF
ENGINEERS CONCERNING THE PROPOSED CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL 66, H. EXEC. DOC. NO. 10,
19TH CONG. (2d Sess. 1826)).
51. See generally CHARLES E. YOE & KENNETH D. ORTH, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PLANNING
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analysis, along with other techniques such as flood frequency calculations,
have always been as much an art as a science. The uncertainties under
which the Corps has had to operate have made it possible to manipulate to
achieve a desired political outcome, a favorable project authorization recommendation. Not surprisingly, the Corps' use of benefit-cost analysis continues to be questioned.5 2
C. The Environmental Movement
The most fundamental challenge to the Corps is the environmental
movement. It questioned both the basic mission of the Corps' hydrologic
modification-and questioned the crucial assumption behind all of the
Corps' methodology-namely, the calculation of an optimum solution. Environmental NGOs initially used the economic critique to challenge the
whole range of Corps activities, from dams to stream channelization. In the
process, NGO's substituted the new paradigm of river use for the pure river
basin development one. To the Corps, rivers have long remained objects of
an imperfect nature to be improved for human progress through the application of science and engineering. As a result of environmentalism, we now
see rivers as integral parts of a natural landscape and as natural systems that
can provide valuable ecosystem services along with the historic benefits.
We also see them as parts of our wilderness heritage. The passage of the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 53 marked the beginning of the end of the Big
Dam era, although this realization did not hit the water resource agencies
until the 1970s. Quite simply, the environmental movement substituted an
ethic of care and stewardship for the traditional view of nature as a treasure
chest of valuable commodities.5 4
The idea of resource stewardship has led to a more radical ecological
ideal of managing river systems to maximize ecological functions-the
maintenance of the river's historic natural "service." The newer ecological
integrity vision is less clearly articulated than multiple use because it rests on
MANUAL (1996), available at http://www.iwr.usace.arny.mil/iwr/pdf/96r21.pdf (last visited May 28,
2004); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PUB. NO. ER 1105-2-100, PLANNING GUIDANCE NOTEBOOK,
available athttp://www.usace.army.mil/inetlusace-docs/eng-reg/erl 105-2-100/toc.htm (last visited May
28, 2004).
52. E.g., TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, CROSSROADS:
CONGRESS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S WATER RESOURCES (2004)

(identifying twenty-nine wasteful Corps projects costing $12
billion),
http://www.taxpayer.net/corpswatch/crossroads (last visited May 28, 2004).

available at

53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2001).
54. JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 28-40 (1974); Gilbert White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 9, 13 (1994).
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a more complex view of the human role in the functioning of natural systems. 55 It starts from the premise that we must try to integrate human uses of
a river system with the maintenance of its natural environmental sustainability,56 both in the design of new projects and the re-engineering and operation
of existing facilities. The current focus is on restoration because river systems are modified but dynamic, ever-changing, functioning ecosystems that
serve a variety of functions-from the maintenance of consumptive uses to
of services, such as biodiversity, polluter filthe provision of a whole range
57
retention.
flood
and
tering,
This river preservation concept is not simple because it will be realized,
if at all, within the framework of environmentally sustainable use and development. River use must always accommodate a sustainable, non-wasteful
level of consumptive use. 58 Although some aquatic scientists want to subordinate human use to the "normative" river, the newer river-as-ecosystem
concept starts from the premise that we must try to integrate human uses of a
river system with the maintenance of its natural environmental sustainability,
both in the design of new projects and the re-engineering and operation of
existing facilities.
The Corps continues to grapple with its self-assumed environmental
stewardship responsibilities within the context of its planning protocols, but
the limits of rational processes that try to get it right "up front" to produce
good resource use and management have eroded over time as we have come
to see the natural world as much more dynamic, rather than static. 59 The
Corps invests great resources in the front-end planning of its activities and
almost nothing on back-end monitoring and adjustment. The result is the
increasing lack of faith in the agency 6 and in the continued refinement of its
traditional analytical processes. 61 Thus, it is appropriate to focus on the
55. I have discussed this paradigm shift at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law Reform in
West Virginia: The Larger Context, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
56. Stanford, supra note 19, at 392-93 (1996).
57. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currenciesand Commodification of EnvironmentalLaw, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 607 (2000).
58.

This concept was endorsed in WESTERN WATER POLICY ADVISORY REVIEW COMMISSION,

WATER INTHE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-2 to 3-3 (1998).
59. See, e.g., DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (1990); STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE'S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE

MANAGEMENT (1995) (discussing new, dynamic approaches to nature management).
60. For a penetrating critique of this problem in all environmental agencies, see generally, SHAPIRO
& GLICKSMAN, supra note 1.
61. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INLAND NAVIGATION SYSTEM PLANNING: THE UPPER
at
available
(2001),
86-87
WAY
WATER
RIVER-ILLINOIS
MISSIssIPPI

http://books.nap.edu/books/6309074053/htmli/index.html (last visited Dec. 14,2004) (concluding that the
Corps' economic model is too flawed to be used in feasibility study of improvements in the Upper Mississippi River navigation system).
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question of whether the continued reliance on rational planning, supported
by the best available technical and scientific information, is the appropriate
model for the "post-modem," post-Big Dam era Corps and whether there
are, in fact, viable alternatives to this model.
111. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CORPS AS NATIONAL RIVER MANAGER
The Corps began as a military fortification construction unit during the
Revolutionary War, but in the early decades of the nineteenth century, it became a water resources management agency. To promote economic development by taming the nation's water resources, the Corps carried forward
the French engineering tradition of state financed, large-scale hydraulic
works built to serve the national military and commercial interest.62 In the
turbulent early years of the Republic, the Corps was the most professional,
scientific organization in the United States and played a major role in adapting European hydraulic studies and river manipulation techniques to the
frontier in order to promote national growth. Its mission quickly expanded
from the construction of defensive fortifications to roads, navigation enhancement, and later, flood control.6 3 However, the Corps' grand vision of
centrally-planned national public works and a scientific survey was opposed
by successive early administrations that feared the creation of a powerful
central government. 64
The Corps was able to thrive in all political environments for two primary reasons. First, for two centuries, the Corps has stood both as an innovative force for integrated water resources planning and as a vehicle for local
interests to construct unintegrated projects of questionable economic, hydraulic, and ecological merit. Second, until the 1960s, the national water
resources debate centered around the best ways to accomplish the Corps'
objectives, not around the objectives themselves. 65 There was a strong national consensus that nature was a commodity to be developed and perfected
for human benefit. Translated to water, this meant that the natural hydrograph of rivers had to be manipulated and "smoothed out" to support national expansion and economic growth. Thus, the flow variability that nature
imposed on rivers had to be substantially reduced by structural solutions to
make them suitable for human use and benefit.

62.

SHALLAT,

supra note 50, at 1-3.

63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 4-7.
65. See generally BEATRICE HORT HOLMES, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Misc. Pub. No. 1233, A HisTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS, 1800-1960 (1972).
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The Revolutionary Era Intellectual and HistoricalRoots of the Corps

The Corps is a product of the Revolutionary War. It traces its origins to
the construction of Bunker Hill fortifications and Forts Norfolk and Nelson
on Chesapeake Bay in 1774-1775. After the war, many politicians opposed
a large, standing professional army, and the idea of national public works
was opposed on constitutional and political grounds. More generally, there
were widespread prejudices against scientific knowledge and planning-a
tension that runs through all efforts to control the use of natural resources to
this day. The Corps survived because its expertise in building military fortifications led naturally to its involvement in civil projects, although support
for this mission fluctuated in the early nineteenth century as the federal role
in national development was debated.
A permanent Corps of Engineers was organized in 1802 at the same time
that the Congress established the military academy at West Point. Initially,
there was no clear division between its military and civilian missions. The
Board of Internal Improvements was premised on the unity of military and
civilian works. The Corps and West Point supported each other for much of
the nineteenth century. After the War of 1812 (1812-1814), the Corps was
underemployed after Congress reduced the standing army to 10,000 men,
and it slowly began to carve out an important civilian role that matured in the
late nineteenth century. The Corps' national role was at the heart of the internal improvement issue. During the 1820s, the earlier constitutional
doubts about the power of the federal government to fund public works were
resolved in favor of a national role. Although Congress never fully adopted
the ideas of Albert Gallatin 66 and Henry Clay's "American Plan" of protective tariffs and internal improvements, the growing power of the western
states created a powerful political constituency for nationally planned and
financed public works. There was considerable opposition to internal road
and canal projects, but the improvement of harbors and inland rivers was
much more widely accepted as a national responsibility because it directly
promoted interstate commerce. The Corps' navigation protection and enhancement role has long rested on a firm constitutional footing. The United
States Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to regulate navigation
that the68states could not authorize interferheld waters.
consistently
in
182467
navigable
withand
interstate
ences

66. ALBERT GALLATIN, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OFTHETREASURY ON THE SUBJECTOF PuBUC
ROADS AND CANALS (1808).

67. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824).
68. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 626-27 (1851).
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B. Anti-Bellum Mission Expansion
To support the westward expansion of the United States, the Corps was
assigned the task of surveying road and canal routes and removing navigation hazards along the major inland rivers. Navigation innovation began on
the Ohio River. Major Stephen H. Long (later a major Western explorer)
constructed an experimental wing dam to increase the velocity of the Ohio
River to shrink a sandbar below Henderson, Kentucky. But the Corps did
not begin the widespread construction of navigation dams and locks until
1874, when the David island lock and dam were constructed below Pittsburgh. The Corps' major innovations were in snag bar removal and dredging technology. The Corps removed thousands of snags in a futile fight
against the treacherous Upper Missouri, which claimed almost "1,000
steamers, ferries, and snagboats" in the nineteenth century before the railroads supplanted navigation. 69 The first hydraulic dredge was constructed in
1871.
Flood control was added to the Corps' mission in 1850 when Congress
appropriated money to survey the Mississippi River. America's Great River,
the Mississippi, was the Corps' laboratory for flood control policy. The
Corps' record is an example of both the strengths and weaknesses of science-based decisions. The 1861 Humphreys-Abbott Report was a major, but
incomplete, study of the flow of a major river, which established a flood control theory that continues to influence thinking today.70 Humphreys and Abbott believed that the flooding of the Mississippi could only be controlled by
the construction of levees, rather than reservoirs.7 ' Eventually, they took
credit for James B. Eads's rival theories that jetty construction would increase the discharge of the river, improving both flood control and navigation. To many, however, the Mississippi is a classic case of the Corps' inflexibility because of its long resistance to upstream flood control storage
and its insistence on a levees-only policy to control floods.72
In 1879, Congress created the Mississippi River Commission,73 which
implemented the levees-only policy. "Levees only" remained the basis of

69. SCHNEIDERS, supra note 2, at 55.
70. A.A. HUMPHREYS & H. L. ABBOT, REPORT UPON THE PHYSICS AND HYDRAULICS OFTHE MISSISSIPPI RIVER (U.S. Army Corps of Topographical Eng'rs, Professional Paper No. 4, 1861).
71. JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND How IT CHANGED
AMERICA 50-54 (1997).
72. E.g., ARTHUR E. MORGAN, DAMS AND OTHER DISASTERS: A CENTURY OFTHE ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS IN CIVIL WORKS 240-51 (1971).

73. 33 U.S.C. § 647 (2001).
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Corps flood control policies in the face of continued major floods and the
success of the flood control dams built by the Miami Conservancy District in
Ohio, based on their pioneering work in estimating storm and flood frequencies. 4
C. The Corpsfrom the ProgressiveConservationEra to the New Deal
The modem Corps is a product of the Progressive Conservation Era,
which was a "moment in time" for American water resources policy. Progressive conservation, spanning from the last decade of the nineteenth century through the first two decades of the twentieth coincided with the rise of
the modem university and their humanities, sciences, and professional
schools. Engineering was a highly prestigious profession, which supported
the era's faith in rational management and progress through the development
and application of technology. Out of this crude focus on science as a guide
to public policy, a holistic vision of watershed and river basins as an integrated natural (the word ecosystem was not used) and social system emerged
for the first time. To this day, the underlying ideal of water management
based on hydrologic rationality rather than regional and local competition for
individual, unintegrated projects remains the major alternative to the politics
of distribution that characterizes federal water resources policy. The Supreme Court endorsed the idea that hydrologic rationality does not respect
political boundaries as an extension of an expansive view of navigability.75
The Court's endorsement helped form the basis for the "pure doctrine of
river basin management," whereby the construction and management of
comprehensively planned, integrated federal projects on the nation's large
rivers promoted regional development. 76 Proponents of comprehensive watershed and river basin planning assumed that large-scale water resource projects were necessary to promote the efficient (non-wasteful) use of water
through multiple purposes and provide widespread benefits to the nation.
The Corps initially resisted multiple purpose development but ultimately
embraced it in the 1920s. Some officials in the newly organized Bureau of
74. Reuss, supranote 43, at 12.
75. E.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 707-09 (1899); United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,409-10 (1940); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941) ("no constitutional reason why Congress cannot under the commerce
power treat watersheds as a key to flood control on navigable streams and their tributaries"); United States
v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960) ("When the United States appropriates the flow
either of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior power under the Commerce Clause,
it is exercising established perogatives and is beholden to no one.").
76. 1 WATER RES. POLICY COMM'N, A WATER POLICY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: THE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMMISSION 52 (1950).
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Reclamation, created to administer the Reclamation Act of 1902, enthusiastically endorsed the idea. But influential members of Congress never accepted the idea of the Inland Waterways Commission championed by President Theodore Roosevelt, and the Corps clung to a narrow flood control and
navigation vision and mission, both to protect its autonomy and to maintain
its support in Congress 77 because the technology for large dams and long
distance electric transmission lines had not been developed in the first decade of the twentieth century. Thus, the Corps came to multiple-purpose dam
construction relatively late as a result of its levees only policy. Until the
1920s, its activities remained closely tied to commercial navigation enhancement and the construction and maintenance of flood control levees. In
many instances, the Corps resisted both popular support for large-scale projects, such as the Chicago-New Orleans Deep Waterway, and new theories
Ultiof water management, such as the multiple purpose dam movement.
78
mately, however, it embraced the concept enthusiastically.
The Great Mississippi flood of 1927 was a traumatic and transformative
event both in American politics and in water policy, and it ultimately led to
large-scale, multiple-purpose development. President Coolidge's characterization of the flood as an act of God and his refusal to support federal flood
relief generated public backlash asserting that the federal government has the
responsibility to supplement the levee program, designed to benefit navigation, with programs designed to protect the valley from future floods. 79 This
ultimately led to the adoption of a more comprehensive river basin approach
with dams, levees, and floodways. In 1927, Congress authorized comprehensive river basin surveys, resulting in the 308 studies.80 In 1936, the
Corps was authorized to build dams when flood control was declared a national responsibility.
The Flood Control Act of 1936 dramatically expanded the Corps' planning role and is the foundation of its current efforts to use good engineering
and physical and social science in project planning. In the go-go years of
national dam building, the 1940s to the 1960s, the Corps was able to build
large reservoirs on many small eastern and midwestern tributaries. The 308
77. The standard history of the movement is discussed in SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND
THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1959).
78. See DONALD J. PISANI, WATER AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE RECLAMATION BUREAU,
NATIONAL WATER POLICY, AND THE WEST, 1902-1935, 286-88 (2002), for a recent and more nuanced

view of the positions of the two major water agencies-the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps-on
multiple-purpose development.
79. BARRY supranote 4 at 369-74.
80. 43 Stat. 948 (1925). 3 WATER RESOURCES LAW: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER

RESOURCES POLCY COMMISSION (1950), remains the most comprehensive survey of the Corps' legal
authority to that time.

1304

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

studies and New Deal's support of large-scale public works enabled the
Corps to expand its activities from the East, Southeast and Midwest to the
Inner-Mountain West and the Pacific Coast. For example, in 1935, the Tucumcari District was established in arid New Mexico to construct the Conchas Dam on the Canadian River. Subsequently, seven major dams were
constructed in southern Colorado and New Mexico. The Corps successfully
out-maneuvered the Bureau of Reclamation for the construction and, thus,
control of reservoirs on the Missouri mainstem, 8 ' the Columbia, and the
Kings and Kern Rivers in California.
Over time, state and local governments came to rely on federal agency
leadership and federal funding for water control projects that often provided
local areas with direct benefits. Decisions about distribution of the federal
financial largesse often were based on political vote trading in Congress,
where individual representatives worked with the agencies and their constituents who stood to benefit from the projects-the "pork barrel ' 82 as critics of the Corps call it. As a result, the "iron triangle"-consisting of the
Corps, powerful Congressional committee chairs, and local project proponents-reduced the executive branch's role to screening out the least justified projects from Congressional consideration, rather than budgeting for an
optimum set of projects derived via a carefully developed planning process.
Since the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, presidents tried, with limited
success, to break this triangle.
D. The Short-Lived Triumph of RationalPlanning
The modem era of the Corps can be characterized by an unsuccessful
search for the "perfect rational" planning process, characterized by planning
at more rational geographic scales, the expansion of the Corps' mission, and
the increased criticism of its missions. Rational planning can be seen as an
end in-and-of itself, as well as a way to discipline the growing taste for federal "pork." The ideal of rational project and city planning is an old one.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century city, however, resource
planning evolved from a purely architectural or engineering function into a
scientific process of information assembly and problem solving.83 The
founding of the United States Geological Survey in 1879 was important in
shifting hydrological research from the diffuse private sector to the govern81. See generally FERRELL, supra note 9; MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT THE AMERICAN
WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER, 176-94 (1986).
82. MAASS, supra note 44, remains the classic articulation of this thesis.
83. See MEL SCOTr, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1980 120-121 (1971).
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ment. Under the leadership of pioneers, such as Robert E. Horton, the focus
of hydrology was on "the conservation of water mass at the scale of the river
basin, 84 which fit nicely with the idea of integrated, technical planning at
large scales.
There was broad public support for this vision of the well-managed watershed where water management was synonymous with controlling how
rivers behave and, more particularly, with taming that behavior. Water project structures were to result in control of the hydrologic extremes and reclamation of arid lands and riverine environments for the prosperity of the
nation. Even calls for non-structural measures rested on a logic that people
should adjust to nature (flood and drought) because adjustment was a practical and cost-effective response to hydrologic extremes85 -not because attempts to control natural variability were either detrimental to the biological
communities of the river or were simply "wrong."
Modem water resources rational planning developed rapidly from the
end of World War II through the early 1960s in response to the construction
of new dams and other water resource projects. Until the late 1940s, engineers made all important water resource decisions. They formed the core of
the emerging discipline of water resource project planning, which became an
important academic subject.86 In 1955, the Rockefeller Foundation funded
the Harvard Water Program, a joint water resource system design seminar for
graduate students and government personal.87 The Corps provided support
for the program from 1961 to 1965.88 The Harvard program combined engineering, systems analysis, and economics in an attempt to plan and design

11
"optimal"
projects. 89 It assumed that a project had a finite number of outputs
that could be measured. Thus, alternative projects could be ranked using
mathematically calculated, sophisticated models that maximized the desired
project outcomes. It was initially attractive, both to the Corps as a way of
enhancing its professional prestige and to the executive branch as a way of
taming the iron triangle.

84. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES 41-42 (1991).

85. Geographer Gilbert White is the leading proponent of the idea that flood damage reduction needs
to consider a mix of structural and non-structural alternatives to prevent the moral hazard problem: reservoirs open flood plains to more intensive development, which increases the damage caused by major
floods. E.g., GILBERT F. WHITE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS (Univ. of Chicago Research Paper
No. 29, 1945); White, supra note 54, at 251.
86.

See generally ARTHUR MAASS ET AL., DESIGN OF WATER-RESOURCE SYSTEMS (1962).

87. Maynard M. Hufschmidt, The HarvardProgram:A Summing Up, in WATER RESEARCH 441-42,
(Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds., 1966).
88. Id. at 442.
89. Id. at 443.
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The Harvard Program became operational during the first Eisenhower
Administration, just as it was implementing a "no new starts policy" for
large water projects. 9° Senator Robert Kerr chaired a Senate Committee that
recommended the construction of new water resource projects having more
sensitivity to pollution and newly identified environmental issues. 9' In 1965,
Congress reacted to the Kerr Report by passing the 1965 Water Resources
Planning Act,92 the high water mark of federal commitment to rational water
resources planning. Ironically, the Act was passed as the national commitment to water control projects was waning and, thus, the analytical tools developed for the ideal or optimal project were, like the 1950s automobiles
with tail fins, obsolete almost from birth. In one view, the Congressional
passage of the Act was an effort to revive a flagging program. The Act created a three part national planning approach to national water resources
management to be administered by a Federal Water Resources Council in
conjunction with regional River Basin Commissions. Water projects were to
follow evaluation practices set forth by the Council. However, this rational
process was adopted just as the federal government lost its taste for large,
regional, subsidized water resources projects as engines of growth, just as
many cities are losing faith in sports stadiums today.
The last major effort to develop a rational, coordinated federal water policy, occurred in response to fears of a large-scale diversion from the Columbia River Basin to southern California, which, ironically, signaled the end of
the big dam or public works era and ushered in the era of environmental protection and greater market discipline. To diffuse interregional tensions,
Congress created, staffed, and adequately funded the National Water Commission. Unfortunately, its 1973 Report 93 was lost in the Watergate scandal.
Nonetheless, it accurately described and endorsed many of the major subsequent developments in water policy because it reflected the transition from
the large dam and construction project era to the post-large dam era.
The Commission's basic message was that the rationality behind subsidized water development no longer existed. The Commission called for an
end to future subsidies for reclamation projects and navigation improvements, greater use of water transfers, more accurate pricing of both irrigation
and M & I water, and it criticized the excessive reliance on structural flood
control measures. Water Policiesfor the Future also contained a penetrating
90. Theodore Shad, An Analysis of the Work of the Senate Select Committee on Nat'l Water Res.,
1959-1961, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 226, 230-31 (1962), sets out the history of the policy.
91. S. REP. No. 87-29, at 1(1961). See also Shad, supra note 90, for a history of the committee.
92. Pub. L. No. 89-90, 79 Stat. 244 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1962d-3 (2001)).
93. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION (1973).

2004]

A FIRST LOOK AT A MODERN LEGAL REGIME

1307

critique of water resources decision making, which it characterized as "an
end in itself."94 It called for greater integration of land use and water planning on the erroneous assumption that Congress would pass a national land
use planning act, that would include federal grants for improved state and
local planning, as well as the integration of water quality and quantity planning, which still occurs only on an ad hoc basis. It also addressed the longstanding problem of competition and duplication among agency functions
and called for a centralized data collection agency. The Commission
stopped short of calling for a Department of Natural Resources because it
forecast the Bureau of Reclamation's long term role as resource manager
rather than project construction agency and saw a similar, but more radically
diminished, role for the Corps of Engineers.9 5
IV. MODERN CHALLENGES: THE POST-MODERN AGENCY AND

ACCOUNTABILITY
The Corps has long embraced the idea of environmental stewardship and
innovative management. 96 The problem is not "talking the talk" but "walking the walk." It has long viewed environmental protection and restoration
as an activity that can be pursued with its existing expertise and within its
legal authorities. Thus, the Corps' environmental mission remains undeveloped. For example, they have no working definition of restoration of the
environment.9 7 More generally, the Corps' methods do not work very well
for environmental problems. In addition to the continuing problem of cost94.
95.
96.
DANIEL

Id. at 366.
Id. at412.
For an early positive assessment of the Corps' acceptance of environmental responsibilities, see
A. MAZAMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, AND THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS (1979).

97. Ecosystem restoration is not self-defining. A major 1992 study adopted a strict definition of
restoration by defining it as "the return of an ecosystem to a close approximation of its condition prior to
disturbance." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS 18(1992). This
definition distinguishes restoration from other lesser improvements such as creation, reclamation and
rehabilitation because only restoration is a "holistic process" rather than "the isolated manipulation of
individual elements." Id. at 17. The Report also distinguished restoration from mitigation, which it dismissed as "simply the alleviating of any or all detrimental effects arising from a given action," as well as
from preservation. Id. at 19. The definition is a useful starting point, but in many cases, the proposed
"restoration" activity may not meet this standard, although it will be a net improvement to the aquatic
ecosystem. Not all definitions are as strict as the NRC's. In 1994, the Ecological Society of America
adopted a resolution that defines restoration more broadly as "the process of repairing damage caused by
humans to the diversity and dynamics of indigenous ecosystems." Laura L. Jackson et al., Ecological
Restoration: A Definition and Comments, 3 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 71, 71 (June 1995). The Corps
should be given the flexibility to adopt restoration objectives for specific systems, but it should not be
allowed to count any effort to modify a pre-existing project to fulfill an environmental objective as aquatic
ecosystem restoration.
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benefit ratio manipulation 98 and the illusion of certainty, the Corps has trouble measuring the value of ecosystem services, deciding the right geographical planning and management scales for project planning and design, and is
just beginning to experiment with adaptive management.
A.

The Corps' New Mission: Restore and Conserve

The Corps plans to reform itself by correcting many of its past "mistakes." 99 The restoration mission of the Corps has been steadily expanding
as aquatic ecosystem restoration becomes a major national priority, 1°° but the
expansion is ad hoc, uneven, and not fully supported by adequate authority
or funding. Subsequent special legislative provisions and omnibus rivers
and harbors development acts have authorized environmental projects to
mitigate for past damages and to restore areas that had been degraded in the
past. For example, section 306 of the Water Resources Development Act
("WRDA") of 1990 identified "environmental protection" as a central mission for the Corps.10 1 Section 307 called for the development of a wetlands
action plan to achieve the goal of "no overall net loss" of the nation's wetland base. 10 2 The Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration
Act of 1990103 authorized the Corps to cooperate with other agencies and the
state of Louisiana to identify and construct wetlands projects. "[E]cosystem
protection and restoration" is now a relevant element in Corps watershed and
river basin assessments, 10 4 and the agency may "carry out an ecosystem restoration and protection project" if it 10"will
improve the quality of the envi5
ronment and will be cost effective."'
Restoration is a profound challenge to the Corps that undercuts the very
foundation of 200 years of national water management policies. Restoration
posits that past hydrologic alterations that affected watershed, hydrologic,
and geomorphologic processes must be reversed and, thus, is the focus for a
significant shift in our attitudes toward water management. For the Corps,
98.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INLAND NAVIGATION SYSTEM PLANNING, supranote 3, at 32-

49 (stating that Corps navigation traffic projections unwarranted).
99. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, USACE 2012, supra note 18, is a formal confession of error.
It formally adopts the agency's principles of environmental protection and endorses a planning process
that is collaborative and comprehensive.
100. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, supra

note 97.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

33 U.S.C. § 2316(a) (2001).
33 U.S.C. § 2317 (2001).
Pub. L. No. 101-646, tit. 111,104 Stat. 4778.
33 U.S.C. § 2267a (2001).
33 U.S.C. § 2330(a)(1) (2001).
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"physical integrity" directs it to restore patterns and timing of flows and
geomorphic processes in our watersheds. Physical integrity means restoring
the natural flows and pulses to our riverine (riparian) areas and strategically
recreating wetlands-upland complexes in our watersheds. This said, restoration is as much an engineering problem as the traditional water development
programs, and it extends to such matters as scheduling reservoir releases to
better mimic historical flows.
B. Adaptive Management: Forcing the Corps to PracticeBack-End
Adjustment
The Corps' expanded stewardship and restoration missions require a
new form of continuous management. The current analytical tool, if it can
be called that, is adaptive management ("AM"). AM is part theology and
part science. As an early proponent observed, with perspicacity, "[aldaptive
management is not really much more than common sense. But common
sense is not always in common use."' °6 AM was developed in the late 1970s
as a criticism of static or deterministic environmental assessment. Howard
Raiffa's pioneering work in the 1960s on decision analysis,10 7 which led to
his famous decision trees-the basis of much private and public rational
planning-was one of the major influences on the development of AM.'0 8
The basic argument was that "a fixed review of an independently designed
policy" °9 was inconsistent with the experience of resource managers worldwide and with what has come to be called non-equilibrium ecology. The
need for rigorous, but flexible, procedures to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty has a long intellectual pedigree.
AM remained primarily an academic construct until the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") emerged as a major barrier to a wide variety of private
and public activities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To prevent its roll
back, the Clinton Administration's Department of Interior responded by
promoting multi-species habitat management plans as a way to conserve species and allow continued land development." l0 AM emerged as a way to
106. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 136 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).
See generallyCARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986); PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN & NATURAL SYSTEMS (Lance H. Gunderson &
C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
107. HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
108. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 106. at 119
(recommending the Raiffa text, as a "good text[]" on applied decision theory).
109. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 106, at 1.

110. See Marc Ebbin, Is the Southern CaliforniaApproach to ConservationSucceeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1997) (discussing the Southern California experiment, which Ebbin predicted would weigh
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push hard problems such as the risk of the future failure of a habitat management plan, far into the future. In the process, AM lost much of its initial
theoretical rigor and coherence and came to stand for any action that had an
experimental component, some monitoring, and called for changes in a conservation regime.
"True" AM, however, is a rigorous, continuous process of acquiring and
evaluating scientific information,"' which requires the practice of regulatory
science and a necessary component of any successful restoration program.
Regulatory science is science designed to answer, to the best extent possible,
causal questions about management choices, such as the minimal viable
population of an at-risk species, and is also designed to help formulate science-based, socially-desired outcomes. Regulatory science requires scientists to contribute to the establishment of standards that have both a normative and scientific component and then to devise ways to measure whether
these standards are being met over time. For example, any effort to create
past conditions requires baselines and performance targets. These are not
strictly scientific questions because they require normative judgments about
the value of the past and the extent to which we wish to try to re-create
them." l2 Nonetheless, these decisions must be informed by science. The
hope is that AM will permit decision makers to avoid the paralysis that scientific uncertainty creates. AM experiments are intended to reduce progressively the initial scientific uncertainty over time.
The Corps has formally embraced AM. The best example is the Corps'
Master Management Plan for the Restoration of the Everglades. In 2000,
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Everglade' s Restoration Plan as part of
the omnibus Water Resources Development Act.'l3 The Everglades ecosystem depends on seasonal sheet flows of water from Kissimmee River in central Florida and Lake Okeechobee. To make South Beach what it is today,
these flows were substantially diverted for agricultural and urban development and flood control. The objective of the legislation is to replumb the
Everglades to restore some measure of pre-diversion flows.' "4 The compreheavily into debates as Congress considered the then upcoming revisions to the ESA).
111. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON
DAM AND THE COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM 52-54 (1999).

112. See A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-PragmaticChallenges of Ecosystem
Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2003) for a more extended discussion of the problems of developing a
science-based legal regime to structure restoration efforts.
113. 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2001). See generallyEVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION
(Steven M. Davis and John C. Ogden eds., 1994); DAVID MCCALLY, THE EVERGLADES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (1999); Carl Walters, et al., ErperimentalPoliciesfor WaterManagement in the Everglades, 2 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 189 (1992).
114. See generallyU.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS & S. FLORIDA WATER MGMT. DIST., CENTRAL AND
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hensive plan for the Everglades requires the continuous and adaptive use of
science, including independent scientific review, so
that "modifications will
' 15
be made in the future based on new information."
C. Three (Among Many) Legal Issues Raised by the Practiceof
Adaptive Management
1. Pre-Existing Entitlements
Adaptive management will be difficult for the Corps to implement in the
many river systems that it now physically controls. To restore these systems,
the agency must depart from clear historic mandates that have generated high
expectations of the maintenance of the status quo. AM often exposes existing stakeholders (who sometimes, but not always, hold legal entitlements) to
additional risks of diminished benefits. The elimination of historic entitlements often raises substantial taking issues under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. 16 The drag of the status quo is illustrated
by efforts to push the Corps to adopt AM on the Missouri River.11 7 The
Pick-Sloan plan turned an unruly river into a series of artificial lakes, which
generated substantial flood control but marginal navigation benefits at the
expense of lost ecosystem services and social equity. 1 8 The Corps has resisted AM, which would require new flow regimes that could disrupt navigation and increase downstream flood risks, in part because the Corps has
statutory duties to protect downstream Missouri River communities from
flood damage and to maintain a nine-foot navigation channel for a very
SOUTHERN FLORIDA COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY: FINAL INTEGRATED FEASIBILITY REPORT AND
PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
STATEMENT
(1999),
available
at

http://www.evergladesplan.org/pub/restudy-eis.cfm (last visited May 28, 2004); Michael Voss, Note, The
Centraland Southern FloridaProjectComprehensive Review Study: Restoring the Everglades,27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 751 (2000).
115.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, I MASTER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PLAN: COMPREHENSIVE

EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN 6 (2000), available at http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/
pm-docs/mpmp/mpmpfinal_000818.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004).
116. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246, 266 (2003). But cf,
County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (not discussing any
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment takings issues).
117. See generally John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management: ProtectingEcologicalFunctionand Legal Process,80 NEB. L REV. 816 (2001). The Columbia
River provides a depressing example of ineffective AM. See generally John M. Volkman & Willis E.
McConnaha, Through a Glass Darkly: ColumbiaRiver Salmon, The EndangeredSpecies Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249 (1993).
118.

See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE

PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY (2002) (tracing the history of the project, describing the environmental and
social costs caused by damming the Missouri, and sets out restoration options).
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small, and decreasing, amount of barge traffic."l 9 Environmentalists argue
that the Corps-which traditionally opposes judicial review on the ground
that there is no law to apply-has discretion under its existing statutes or the
Endangered Species Act. These arguments came to a head in the summer of
2003.
In 2003, the Corps decided to respond to a drought by releasing water
from the largest reservoir in South Dakota, Lake Oahe, to maintain a ninefoot navigation channel downstream. South Dakota successfully sued to
enjoin the release because a release would reduce the prey of a major reservoir sport fish, the walleye. The Corps then proposed to take the water from
Lake Francis Case, lower on the system, but South Dakota obtained an injunction requiring the water levels to be maintained in both lakes through the
spawning season. To prevent the Corps from moving upstream, North Dakota obtained an injunction to protect Lake Sakakawea. Nebraska, in turn,
obtained an injunction requiring a water release. The Eighth Circuit ultimately held that the Corps was bound by its own Master Manual because the
Corps was estopped from claiming that it was nonbinding. 120 The upstream
states sued to protect an "exotic" sport fishery. The Missouri River also has
two species of fish that need spring rises and two endangered birds.
In 2000, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a Biological Opinion that
recommended a spring rise every three years to benefit these species,' 2' but
this option was considered by the Corps and then dropped after extreme
pressure from downstream navigation interests. 122 In 2003, however, the
Fish and Wildlife Service engaged in more "political science" and issued a
Supplemental Biological Opinion that found no jeopardy because "future
operation will be consistent with the 2000 Biological Opinion." After the
Eighth Circuit vacated the North and South Dakota injunctions, an environmental NGO convinced a District Court in Washington to require a spring
rise, to preserve the pallid sturgeon and to limit summer flows to prevent the
nests of least terns and piping plovers. The district court held that the Corps
had the discretion to comply with the ESA, that compliance "can come at the
expense of other interests," and that the 2003 Supplemental Biological Opin119. See generally MICHAEL W. BABCOCK & DALE G. ANDERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
FUND, DOES BARGING ON THE MISSOURI RIVER PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS? (1999), available at

http://www.edf.org/documents/743_missouri.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004).
120. South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1029 (8th Cir. 2003).
121. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE MISSOURI
RIVER MAIN STEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MISSOURI RIVER BANK
STABILIZATION AND NAVIGATION PROJECT, AND OPERATION OF THE KANSAS RIVER RESERVOIR SYSTEM

(2000), available at http://www-mr.usacc.army.mil/mmanual/opinion.htm (last visited May 28, 2004).
122. Am. Rivers v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 274 F. Supp. 2d 62, 65-66 (D.D.C. 2003)
(civil contempt).
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ion was inconsistent with the ESA because it was likely that it had no reasonable chance of occurring. Eventually, the cases were transferred to a district judge in Minnesota under the complex litigation transfer procedure, and
the judge held that the agency must comply with the ESA. American Rivers
was an easy case because the crucial scientific document carried its own
death wound. The court found that the FWS has failed to articulate any reasonable explanation for its departure-not to say abandonment of the analysis contained in the 2000 Biological Opinion.
The story continues as downstream navigation interests have no incentive to compromise. The Bush H Administration tried to solve the problem
by redoing the science, but it did not totally solve the problem in the process.
The Fish and Wildlife Service was ordered to review the 2000 Biological
Opinion, and an outside team of scientists was brought in to perform the review. The team basically agreed with the previous opinion that a spring rise
and summer low flow were necessary to protect the pallid sturgeon. 23 However, the Corps continues to resist any flow release pattern that threatens to
disrupt navigation, and a federal district court has held that the Corps has the
discretion to consider ways to comply with the ESA other than seasonable
flow adjustments. 124
2. A Hard Look at What?
AM will be difficult for courts to supervise because it does fit the preferred model of a final, rule-based administrative decision supported by a
record. The legal consequences of this are significant because it presents a
set of legal problems different from the usual administrative law ones. The
great project of modem administrative law has been to cabin the exercise of
agency discretion. Although the Supreme Court has virtually refused to use
the delegation doctrine as a control mechanism, 125 it has shown great, if
wildly inconsistent, enthusiasm for the general project.
There is much talk of alternatives to rule-based regulation, but the application and formulation of rules remain the bedrock of administrative regula123. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, AMENDMENT TO THE 2000 BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE MISSOuRI RIVER MAIN STEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
THE MISsOuRI RIVER BANK STABILIZATION AND NAVIGATION PROJECT, AND OPERATION OF THE KANSAS RIVER RESERVOIR SYSTEM (2003), availableat http://www.fws.gov/feature/pdfs/FinalBO.pdf (last

visited May 28, 2004).
124. In re Operation of the Missouri River System, 2004 WL 1402563 (D. Minn. June 21, 2004).
See Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discoveryfor Missouri River Management, 83 Neb. L. Rev.
401 (2004) for a discussion of the continuing search for effective environmental management of the
river.
125. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
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tion and create the basis for judicial control. Separation of powers principles
require that courts intone the deference formula. Since the 1970s, the real
judicial standard has been the "hard look" doctrine. 126 The underlying assumption behind the "hard look" judicial standard is that the agency will
engage in a rational process to reach a final decision, explain it in a form as
coherent as a B-plus appellate opinion, and that the process of the decision
and the explanation can be sufficiently understood by a court to check it
against the appellate opinion model of coherence and consistency with the
"evidence." The "hard look" doctrine opened the whole area of informal, or
non-adjudicatory, non-rulemaking action to judicial review. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc. 127 appeared to abandon the project, but the Supreme Court has recently28recognized that there is a
role for judicial review of agency policymaking.1
It is hard to apply the "hard look" doctrine to traditional Corps activities
because the Corps' interpretations of their management mandates enjoy a
high, but not unlimited, level of deference. 29 Thus, it will be even harder to
do to adaptive management in that context. The "hard look" doctrine assumes that there is a final record that can be examined. AM experiments
will (or should) have a management plan, but the plan will evolve over a
long period of time. It is hard for courts to review final, science-based decisions, like a pollutant standard, and AM poses greater challenges. AM science will be a series of hypotheses and "[tihe test should be whether the experiment is based on a reasonable hypothesis and ' not
whether the desired
30
positive result is certain or more likely to happen."'
Based on experience, the likelihood of holding agencies that practice
hyper-rationality accountable is not promising. The primary decisions that
126. The term was first introduced by Judge Harold Leventhal in GreaterBoston Television Corp. v.
FCC,444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), but the foundation of the doctrine is Citizensto PreserveOverton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Professor Sidney A. Shapiro characterizes modem administrative law in terms of the 1960s "reformation," characterized by more open processes, and the inevitable
"counter-reformation," which relies on hyper-rational front-end decision processes. Sidney A. Shapiro,
Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation:Restoring Faith in PragmaticGovernment, 48 U.

KAN. L REv. 689, 984-90 (2000). He observes that the "hard look" doctrine has been a foundation of
both the reformation and counter-reformation. Id. at 690.
127. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron established a two-tier standard for judicial review of agency regulations. If the statute clearly addresses the
issue, review is de novo; if the statute is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference.
See Thomas Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
128. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001). See Charles H. Koch, Jr., JudicialReview ofAdministrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L.

REV. 375 (2002) (asserting the difference between judicial review of statutory interpretation and review of
administrative policymaking).
129. E.g., ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
130. Davidson & Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management, supra note 117, at 859.
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the Corps has made historically consider whether a recommended project has
a positive benefit-cost ratio.' 3' The Corps has a long history of inflated and
methodologically unsound benefit-cost analysis techniques, but accountability can occur only when the press or a neutral group "spotlights" the inflation. After the passage of NEPA, courts held that some discussion of costs
and benefits had to be included in an EIS.1 32 This first step was extended to
an increased willingness to probe the merits of a benefit-cost ratio. 133 However, they soon retreated,' 34 except in rare cases where the ratio is per se
flawed, thereby inflicting its own death wound. 35 The refusal to probe all
but the most flawed ratios is correct because the Constitution does not require that the Congress fund only projects with a positive benefit-cost ratio.

36

3.

AM Increases the Risk of Excessive Politicization of Corps
Activities

However, as the cases discussed in Section V.B indicate, courts can

37
use paper trails to review on-going management and planning processes.1

The Corps is no stranger to politics. As a recent historian of the Corps
wrote:
The Corps try as it might, could never escape the fact that army engineering was often the political science that forced builders into complex

disputes. Engineers considered themselves tough-minded problem solvers,
131. The requirement dates to the Flood Control Act of 1936, which requires that Congress should
undertake flood control works "if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. §
701a-1 (2001).
132. E.g., Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (discussing necessity of setting
forth cost and benefit factors in an EIS).
133. See generally, Envtl. Def. Fund v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'dsub. nom.
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Callaway, 497 F. 2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289,
1362-81 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th
Cir. 1974).
134. E.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (NEPA does not require an EIS
to include a benefit-cost ratio). Courts have occasionally suggested that it could review a benefit-cost ratio
if Congress would be misled by an erroneous calculation, S. Louisiana Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629
F.2d 1005, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980), but courts have not applied this standard.
135. The leading case is Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437 (4th Cir.
1996), where gross rather than net recreational benefits were calculated when study specifications required
calculation of net benefits. On remand, the court approved the redone ratio. Hughes River Watershed
Conservancy v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 1999).
136. United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. W. Virginia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941).
137. I am indebted to Professor Jody Freeman of UCLA for pointing out that the lack of a complete
record does not preclude effective judicial review.
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men who cut through conjecture by staying true to the facts. Congress,
however, increasingly relied on the builders to speculate, negotiate, bridge
political conflicts, and use engineering in ways never discussed at West
Point. 138

The Corps has had a schizophrenic attitude toward the politics of pork.
On the one hand, they have embraced it as a way to sustain itself. On the
other, the agency has always prided itself on its ability to perform sound,
independent project analysis, which naturally weeds out rotten pork. In recent years, the agency's ability to ride the tiger and to preserve a measure of
independence has been undermined by two related developments: cost sharing and the focus on collaborative watershed management.
Cost sharing shifts some of the costs of a Corps project from the federal
treasury to the local beneficiaries, although it can be waived in appropriate
instances. 39 Non-federal beneficiaries of Corps projects had long bourne
some of the costs of project construction on an ad hoc basis, mainly in the
form of land and easement transfers and dredged material disposal areas. In
the 1970s, momentum for increased Corps fiscal discipline began to build.
A coalition of fiscal conservatives and environmentalists agreed that formal
cost-sharing was a desirable Corps reform because it would eliminate projects of marginal value. The 1986 Water Resources Development Act
adopted cost-sharing and also authorized a backlog of delayed projects.
Ironically, cost-sharing has increased the power of local sponsors and
their Congressional representatives to influence project selection and design.
Thus, the Corps' influence in the traditional iron triangle has been diminished. Numerous studies have observed the close relations among the Corps,
members of Congress, and local project proponents, to the exclusion of the
executive branch140 and the general public. 14 ' The assumption was that the
138. Id. at 122.
139. In brief, cost-sharing is based on ability to pay, and the Secretary of the Army may vary the formulas for structural and non-structural flood control measures and for agricultural water supply projects.
For example, for harbor projects, construction cost-sharing increases with the harbor depth. Operation
and maintenance cost-sharing reverses the equation. Shallow harbors must pay 100 percent of the costs
but deep-draft harbors need only pay a maximum of fifty percent of these costs. The cost sharing rules for
structural flood control require a minimum twenty-five percent land, material and a minimum five percent
cash contribution from local sponsors. Non-structural flood control measures have a separate cost-share
formula; they must either contribute twenty-five percent of the cost in land, cash, easements, disposal sites
or make up the difference. Inland navigation projects remain 100 percent federally financed but the federal share is evenly split between general revenues and the user fees.
140. For an analysis of the executive branch's consistent struggle to incorporate efficiency considerations into environmental policy, see RANDALL LUTTER & JASON F. SHOGREN, PAINTING THE WHITE
HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (2004).
141. See, e.g., JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION,
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Corps was either in control of the process or an equal partner. Cost-sharing
often makes the Corps simply the implementation agency for decisions taken
by the project sponsors and members of Congress. At a minimum, it is
harder for the agency to exercise its traditional independent review function.
Cost-sharing has also narrowed the geographic scale of Corps planning at a
time when many are asking it to expand planning to a watershed or river basin scale.
Cost-sharing has fundamentally changed the traditional iron triangleCongress, the Corps, and the local beneficiaries-by creating more of a
pincher. The Corps' rational planning process has been compromised because cost-sharing makes local sponsors and their Congressional representatives more powerful than the Corps. Cost-sharing has eliminated some marginal projects and some with high environmental costs. However, it has
contributed to the fragmentation of Corps authority in two important ways.
First, it has kept alive or revived "legacy" projects--controversial projects
that had been shelved by the 1986 cost sharing reforms and by Washington
level reviews. However, a series of actions in the mid-1990s that relaxed the
review of project justifications and that relaxed cost sharing requirements for
these selected projects allowed these legacy projects to regain momentum.
Second, local project sponsors have few incentives to link projects to a larger
watershed perspective, for example.
Stakeholder collaboration is an alternative to traditional command and
control regulation and the informal agency decision making long practiced
by the Corps. 42 The agency is increasingly asked to come "reason together" 143 by participating in both large and small scale watershed governance processes. These processes can both encourage large-scale comprehensive solutions and require the Corps to share its decision making authority
with stakeholders.
In the 1990s, the buzzword in water management was watershed planning, and it continues to be the primary objective of federal and state water
agencies, including the Corps.' nn There are numerous large and small water1947-68 (1974); MAASS, supra note 44.
142.

See THOMAS M. KOONTz ET AL., COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT? WHAT

ROLES FOR GOVERNMENT? (2004), for a close look at the role of public participants in collaborative processes. See also Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaborationas the Basisfor
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).
143. The quotation, "Come now, let us reason together,says the LORD: though your sins are like
scarlet,they shall be as white as snow; though they are red like crimson, they shall become like wool," is

from Isaiah 1:18 and was frequently invoked by the late President Lyndon B. Johnson to support civil
rights legislation.
144. See J.B. Ruh] et al., Proposalfor a Model State Watershed ManagementAct, 33 ENVTL. L 929,

930-33 (2003) (discussing the importance the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency, and at least
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shed initiatives underway in the United States. Some are simply information
sharing fora, and others seek to solve specific physical and regulatory problems by using consensus among stakeholders to secure government and private approval of specific programs that meet federal and state regulatory objectives. Watershed planning is a smaller scale version of the Conservation
Era principle that river basins should be viewed as planning and management units. The "scaled-down" version of the dream of hydrologic rationality is both a reflection of the bankruptcy of earlier central river planning efforts and of the limits of command and control regulation to address
problems that do not lend themselves to a simple technological solution.
Water resources planning was "scaled down" and decentralized from the
1970s to the 1990s, along with the rest of the federal government. Earlier
river basin commissions were dismantled and, eventually, were partially replaced by ad hoc efforts to address specific large river issues, primarily compliance with the Endangered Species Act. 145 From this smaller, watershedlevel initiatives sprang up across the landscape to address modem issues,
such as aquatic ecosystem restoration and the control of non-point source
pollution in the absence of express federal legislation. As a substitute for
actual management, many federal agencies including EPA, the Forest Service and the Corps have turned to the idea of watershed planning. The basic
idea is to substitute stakeholder processes and voluntary agreements for topdown regulation. Watershed protection efforts must overcome fragmented,
incomplete, and shared regulatory mechanisms existing, both among and
within the three levels of government and to overcome the existing allocation
of water and land entitlements. Thus, the geographic focus of legal regulation is inevitably narrow, and it is difficult for mission agencies to cross political and cultural boundaries and for units of government to cooperate and
share power among themselves as well as the former regulated community,
who are now characterized as "stakeholders."

twenty states place on watershed management policy).
145. See Joseph L Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of
Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L REV. 2377 (2000) (detailing three cases where the needs of species
listed under the Endangered Species Act have conflicted with other uses of numerous rivers).
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A.

CongressionalIntervention Would Help

One of the most frequent criticisms of the Corps of Engineers is that it is
increasingly being asked to undertake multiple, potentially competing, missions with very little statutory guidance. 146 The Corps generally studies all
aspects of the problem and the range of management options, but often it
does not integrate the scientific research that addresses possible adverse environmental impacts and adaptive management options. Not surprisingly,
the Corps frequently chooses a management option that least disturbs the
status quo, usually navigation enhancement and flood control. The roots of
the problem lie partially in the accretive, unintegrated legal structure under
which the Corps operates.
The Corps is often portrayed by environmentalists as an unaccountable,
"out of control" construction agency 147 or, in the alternative, as a chronically
timid innovator. The reality is that the Corps is a highly accountable agency
to its main constituencies, namely Congress and project beneficiaries. Paradoxically, this makes traditional judicial accountability almost impossible.
The traditional model of agency accountability assumes a unified Congressional understanding of the agency's policy. Oversight committees then police deviations from adherence to the policy. In the post-modem political
world, things are more complex. In a recent article, Professors J.R. DeShazo
and Jody Freeman identify disturbing new administrative phenomena which
they call disjointed majoritarianism and sub-majoritarianism. 14 In brief,
coalitions of oversight committee members are able to subvert an unamended statute by tempering its specific application to specific geographical
areas. The major problem is that agencies are not, as constitutional law
would suggest, accountable to the formal mandate of Congress, but rather to
individual members who reject the mandate. The Corps does not strictly fit
this model because there is no uniform federal water policy, but the model
highlights the fact that there may be other examples of undesirable, unanticipated forms of agency accountability.

146. E.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS UPPER
MISSISSIPPI-IUJNOIS WATERWAY RESTRUCTURED FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTERIM REPORT 12 (2004).

147. Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L REV. 641,679-82 (1999), marshals the
relevant literature for this view.
148. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The CongressionalCompetitionto Control DelegatedPower,81
TEx. L. REV. 1443, 1500-02 (2003).
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To complicate matters, the Corps gives the illusion of a monolithic central agency. Formally, it is a unitary, military unit with a strong, central
chain-of-command, but in reality, the Corps is a de facto federal institution.
Over time, power has devolved to the local districts. The main reason is cost
sharing. It has given local sponsors, local representatives, and senators a
greater role in project selection, designs, and, most importantly, scope.
Congressional reform is especially needed because the Corps has
long operated under a legal regime, agency practice, and culture that developed when there was little need to justify its mission or to defend itself in
court. This regime worked quite well when the Corps needed only to fulfill
its mission by planning and constructing a project and operating it to fulfill
the original objectives. Congress never enacted organic legislation 149 for the
Corps because there was no need for it. Instead, the agency's authority
comes through individual congressional project authorizations and random
grants of general authority. This legal regime is much like Chinese dynastic
history: each new history is added to others and nothing is subtracted or integrated. 50 These conditions no longer hold today, and the legal regime that
supports the agency has become increasingly dysfunctional as the agency
increasingly finds itself being asked to respect or restore the natural hydrograph, to protect ecosystem services or values, and to manage these systems
adaptively. There have been profound changes in social values since the
1930s and the 1940s, but Congress has never revisited the legislation from
this era.
Congress need not micro-manage every project. Instead, it could give
the Corps organic legislation, which would put the agency's new missions
on a firmer legal footing than they enjoy today. The Corps has considerable
discretion to innovate, but it views much innovation as potentially ultravires
because it is not explicitly grounded in the authorizing legislation statute and
is potentially inconsistent with its primary missions.

149. I use organic legislation in the sense as it is understood in modern public land law. Robert L.
Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarksof Modern Organic Legislation, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 503 (2002), defines public land organic legislation as "a charter for a network of
public lands." As applied to the Corps, organic legislation would be a comprehensive charter that rationalizes all Corps activity.
150. The focus of this Article is on the problems of applying rule of law values to an experimental
management and regulatory environment. It does not deal extensively with the question of the appropriate
"density" of Corps laws and regulations. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen:
The Problemof RegulatoryAccretion in the AdministrativeState, 91 GEO. L. J. 757 (2003), for an analysis of the relationship between the density of regulation and compliance with the mandates of the regulatory regime. See supranotes 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties that the
Corps accretive regime causes for holding it accountable for the experiments that it is being asked to run.
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B. A Selective HardLook at the Agency's Good FaithEfforts to Run a
Credible AM Experiment
The two most promising judicial control candidates for the post-modem
Corps are the non-delegation doctrine and the hard look doctrine. Stakeholder participation raises the risk that public policy will be made by private
individuals without the filter of the legislative process or administrative
agency oversight.15 ' Even the present formalist Supreme Court has not used
the non-delegation doctrine to control administrative agencies.152 However,
the delegation of law making to private groups stands on a different footing.153 Federal and state courts apply the non-delegation to a private party
doctrine to delegations that permit agency abdication. For example, courts
have applied the doctrine to federal land management agencies, which delegated authority to local resource users in a way that creates a substantial risk
that federal management
duties, such as biodiversity conservation, will be
54
compromised.
A selective hard look at AM experiments is a more promising approach.
Courts have been known to review planning exercises that involve AM, although challenges to AM are often embedded challenges to large-scale efforts to implement the Endangered Species Act through Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). The Clinton Administration pioneered a number of
experiments to implement the ESA through Habitat Conservation Plans or
other processes that promised multi-species protection on an ecosystem basis. These efforts are a high-risk effort to induce regulatory community participation by minimizing the risk of ESA enforcement. There is a tendency
to use such processes and the glittering promise of AM to defer important
regulatory choices that threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the plan.
Courts have held that such plans are inconsistent with the mandates of the
ESA, and have, in the process, distinguished between bona fide and faux
AM.

151.

The Role of CollaborativeGroups in FederalLand and Resource Management:A Legal Analy-

sis, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 67 (2003), is the most comprehensive treatment of this issue.
152. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001).
153. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). Professor Jody Freeman is the most enthusiastic supporter of the principle of private delegation because it is a "fact of life." Jody Freeman, The
PrivateRole in Publicof PublicGovernance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 586 (2000).

154. E.g., Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999); Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985). For a rationale for judicial intervention
see George Cameron Coggins, "Devolution" in Federaland Land Law: Abdication by Any Other Name,
3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 211 (1996).

1322

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

The successful challenge to an ineffective plan in Oregon NaturalResources Council v. Daley155 illustrates the ability of courts to weed out faux
AM experiments. The case was a challenge to a state plan to save endangered Pacific coast salmon. The populations of evolutionary significant
units (a relatively untested species grouping under the ESA) of coastal coho
salmon have been declining due to a variety of anthropocentric and natural
causes. The anthropocentric causes include timber harvest practices, livestock grazing, and water diversions. The decision of whether to list the coho
as a threatened species under the ESA was a political football throughout the
1990s because protection and restoration required intensive public and private land use and water management. There is no quick technological fix
and the reserve strategy applied to terrestrial fauna is not applicable. In
1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service withdrew an earlier proposal to
list the coho and decided not to list the coho as threatened because the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative-which supplemented the Northwest Forest Management Plan adopted in 1994 to save the spotted owlwould reverse the population decline.
California units were listed, however, because the state apparently made
a calculated political decision not to formulate a similar initiative. Scientific
opinion within NMFS was divided on the effectiveness of the initiative and
on the need to list the species. When the Oregon plan was challenged, a
Magistrate Judge invalidated the decision not to list because NMFS applied
the wrong ESA standard in its decision not to list. A species must be listed
if it is likely to become extinct in the foreseeable future, but the Service only
evaluated the effect of the initiative on population declines over a two year
period. The primary flaw in NMFS' approach was to base its decision not
on science, but on faith in future actions taken by the legislative and executive branches of Oregon. "NMFS ... was unwilling to make the hard choice
required by the ESA .... ." Oregon's initiative relied in part on voluntary
watershed councils where landowner participation was "largely voluntary,"
and NMFS had rejected California's action plan, in part, because the state
had not funded a paper watershed initiative and landowner participation was
voluntary. This led to the conclusion that reliance on the state's initiative
was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on unimplemented, largely
voluntary future actions. 5 6 The Court found the agency's failure to explain
155. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
156. A series of previous district court opinions held that the FWS could not rely on possible future
management actions by other agencies. Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C.
1996); Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996). The Ninth Circuit held that the
FWS could not excuse its duty to designate critical habitat for the California Gnatcatcher on an elaborate
reserve system created under a voluntary state program. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep't of the
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why Oregon's initiative did not pose the same risks as California's "telling"
and concluded "[h]owever laudable Oregon's efforts to employ new management techniques to try to restore the Oregon Coast ESU, such
future vol157
untary conservation effort cannot be a substitute for listing."'
Judge David Levi's review of an HCP for an area north of Sacramento
equally provides a model of when and how courts need to intervene in a
long-run experiment with an important AM component.1 8 A proposed HCP
obligated a multi-jurisdictional agency, the Natomas Basin Conservancy, to
assemble several connected blocks of land funded by development fees. The
pay-off for the plan was a Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion,
which would issue umbrella incidental take permits to several local governments and water districts. Any large HCP must balance immunizing immediate development from a section 9159 taking suit with a plan that will conserve multiple species for the long run. To do this, the plan has to make
crucial assumptions. The Natomas Basin Plan's assumption were (1) only
about a third of the basin would in fact be developed and (2) future threats to
the species' continued survival and development that took place around the
reserve system could be minimized through aggressive adaptive management.
The National Wildlife Federation challenged the basic theory that the Incidental Take Permits could proceed as a complete plan based on extensive
scientific research and thus challenged the plan's reliance on AM to correct
any errors in the initial scientific assumptions. Specifically, it argued that
the Plan must estimate the number of species and the number that will be
taken. The court brushed this aside by holding that the HCP must meet the
minimum statutory requirements under the Chevron deference standard. 16o
Plaintiffs also challenged the Service's projection (speculation) that only
17,500 acres of the basin would be developed and the consequent conclusion
that a combination of reserve and retention of agricultural land would be
sufficient to protect the covered species. These were found to be within the
Service's expert discretion because they concerned "the uncertainties inherent in the market-based mitigation mechanism employed by HCP" 161 and
Interior, 113 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997).
157. Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1159 (D. Or. 1998).
158. Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
159. Section 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2001), prohibits public and private parties from taking a listed
species. Babbitt v. Sweet Home ChapterofCommunitiesfor a GreatOregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), holds
that the Department of Interior may define a taking as habitat modification. The limits of this discretion
have not been defined. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion argued that there must be proximate cause
between the destruction and an increased risk of species loss.
160. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
161. Id. at 1298.
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were, therefore, an inevitable part of the complicated decision making that
led to the HCP.
Judge Levi did not invalidate the key risk assumptions behind the plan
and AM; instead, the court zeroed in on the weakest deals, which placed limits on the future use of AM. These included the disconnect between a regional plan and the lack of regional responsibility and the Department's inability to nail down adequate funding. 162 First, the court invalidated the
Service's conclusion that the amount of the mitigation fee would be sufficient to acquire the necessary habitat because it was unsupported by substantial evidence and, therefore, arbitrary. Administrative purists may object to
combining an adjudicative and rule making or informal decision standard,
but the court, in effect, enforced the Supreme Court's Nolan-Dolan standard,
which requires that land exactions be based on a reasonable showing of need
and that the exaction is proportionate to the need generated by the land use
activity. 163 By failing to demonstrate compliance with the standard, the Department of Interior may have over or underestimated the necessary level of
exaction. Likewise, the court held that the Department could not issue a
permit after the city refused to assume financial liability for the implementation of the plan. 164
The Service's willingness to go ahead without an adequate funding
mechanism also extended to its willingness to approve a regional HCP premised on the participation of only one public actor, the city of Sacramento,
when, in fact, the success ultimately depends on multi-jurisdictional cooperation. This was fatal for several reasons, including the failure to discuss
the effect on the reserve and corridor design if only the city participated in
the plan. In short, the Service's failure to consider whether the survival of
the species will be put at risk by the City's permit, if the regional mitigation
165
approach of the HCP is not available, is arbitrary and capricious."'

162. See John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and Imperiled Wildlife, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10712 (2001); see generally, William Rodgers, The Myth of Win-Win: Misdiagnosis in

the Business of Reassembling Nature, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 297 (2000).
163. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994).
164. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99.
165. Round Two of the litigation has begun. In 2004, the National Wildlife Federation filed a second
suit alleging that the revised plan had the same flaws as the original. Harold Kruger, Natomas Plan
Sparks Lawsuit, THE MARYSVILLE APPEAL-DEMOCRAT, March 25, 2004.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Corps has at least four options to adapt to the changing United
States water policy environment it faces: (1) limp along with the status quo
and increasingly become the project manager for individual members of
Congress; (2) return to the go-go years of project construction, today primarily for water supply needs and for additional flood control, as some members
of Congress and state water officials ardently desire; 166 (3) promote the incremental improvement of its rational methods with modest supplementation
such as peer review; or (4) reinvent itself as a restoration agency. The-fourth
option would serve the national interest in sustainable water use. Legal accountability must come through a combination of a new legal structure for
the Corps, limited judicial control, new internal checks, such as peer review, 167 and an agency embrace of the need for more experimental water
management strategies.

166. FRESHWATER SUPPLY, supra note 14, reports that two states, Colorado and South Carolina,
expected statewide shortages, sixteen states across the country expected regional shortages, and eighteen
expected local shortages. Increased federal funding for storage and distribution capacity was the first
priority among those surveyed.
167. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR WATER RESOURCES
PROJECT PLANNING (2002). The uses and abuses of peer review are discussed in J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing
the Right Dose of PeerReview for the EndangeredSpecies Act, 83 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004).

